The 'access to justice' within the meaning of the Treaty of Lisbon and the pertinent CJEU jurisprudence is primarily seen as access to the EU judicial system, i.e. to the EU Member States' national courts applying the EU Law or/and the CJEU. The concept of 'access to justice'
INTRODUCTION INDIVIDUAL IN EU LAW
In Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU explicitly recognised the potential of an individual as a subject of the EU Law, although making the access to justice conditional upon 'direct effect' of the EU Law provisions in question, while also connecting the importance of cooperation between the individual and the EU legal system. 14 This premise was developed after the Treaty of Lisbon adoption due to the new constructs of annulment proceedings (Art. 263 TFEU) and the defensive approach towards the preliminary rulings procedure (Art. 267 TFEU) as an individual Human Rights guarantee from the part of the ECtHR.
LOCUS STANDI OF INDIVIDUALS FOR THE PURPOSES OF ART.

263(4) TFEU
As a reaction to a wave of critique after the Courts' earlier judgments in the concern' precluding individuals from the usage of the annulment procedure, the TFEU created a potential for easier access to the EU legal system via the relaxation of the standing rules in relation to generally applicable Union acts. 17 The text of Art. 263(4)
TFEU directly enables '[a]ny natural or legal person', under the conditions laid down
in the first and second paragraphs, to institute proceedings under the EU Law against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and -in efforts to improve judicial protection for individuals -relaxes the standing requirements by removing the condition of individual concern for the category of regulatory acts which are of direct concern to such persons and do not entail implementing measures. 18 The CJEU has recently made several important clarifications of these Treaty provisions, while giving interpretation to the notions of 'regulatory act' and an 'act which does not entail implementing measures' for the purposes of Art. 263(4) TFEU.
In Inuit, 19 the CJEU defined a 'regulatory act' as an act of general application adopted according to a procedure which is different from the legislative one (ordinary or special) as defined in Art. 289 TFEU. In T&L Sugars, the EU Court of Justice espoused a broad interpretation of 'implementing measures', including any measure that at the European or national level gives effect or even only applies a regulatory act, irrespective of the existence of any discretion on their side to decide on the content of that measure. 20 In almost all cases, the Court emphasized the rationale of Art.
263(4) TFEU -to give access to justice to individuals that otherwise would not have other alternatives than infringing the law. 21 Nevertheless, in Inuit or T&L Sugars the EU Court of Justice reasserted the Plaumann test, despite it having been criticised for being based on a formalistic rather than substantial element. 22 Although in Inuit the CJEU agreed that the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263 TFEU must be interpreted in view of the right to effective judicial protection proclaimed by Art. 47 of the Charter, the Court emphasized that such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in the Treaty. 23 Inuit is also important since it proclaimed that '…it is therefore for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the fundamental 17 Bosphorus. 28 These lines of legal reasoning make clear that the EU Court of Justice is now unwilling to reconsider its well-entrenched Plaumann-doctrine for direct actions, while the case law on individual access to justice at national level looks seemingly progressive and makes an emphasis on the duty of consistent interpretation that is resting upon the national courts in this respect. States.
LOCUS STANDI OF INDIVIDUALS FOR THE PURPOSES
However, preliminary rulings procedure has historically been an important route of access to the CJEU from the part of individuals since it is the initiative of the party of the case which often instigates a judge to request a preliminary ruling. 29 The need for this cooperation between the individual, national court and the EU Court of Justice arises from two limitations of the Union system, i.e. the lack of standing for individuals to bring appeals from national judicial decisions or bring an action for annulment to the EU Court of Justice on the one hand, and the CJEU's lack of coercive powers to enforce its judgments on the other -which makes the preliminary rulings procedure the only (indirect) way for individuals to challenge national law inconsistent with the EU Law provisions.
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Again, it is still within the discretion of the Member States to enable a party of the case to invoke a preliminary ruling mechanism. For example, in Germany the judge's refusal to submit a request to the CJEU may be considered a breach of the constitutional right to 'a lawful judge' under Art. 101 (1) (4) TFEU, the CJEU seems to recognise a preliminary rulings procedure as a way of challenging of European Law alternative to the individual action of annulment.
The recent developments in the ECtHR case-law interpreting the position of the EU individual in preliminary rulings procedure in the light of Art. 6 ECHR ('the right to a fair trial') also present a special interest for the present research. In some way, the ECtHR was forced to touch upon the question of EU Law in cases concerning the failure of the national court to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU, finding this under certain circumstances to constitute a violation of Art. reference were disregarded by the same court in question; the only aspect which was considered was whether the issue was an acte clair or an acte éclairé. According to the ECtHR, it was therefore not clear from the reasoning of the judgment whether that question was considered irrelevant, related to a provision which was clear or had already been interpreted by the CJEU, or whether it was simply ignored; it therefore came to the conclusion that there had been a breach of Art. 6 ECHR. 
'ACCESS TO JUSTICE' AND VAN GEND EN LOOS: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COURTS
The judgment, through the direct effect doctrine, created a two-level system of EU Law adjudication: the CJEU and the Member States courts, acting as an integral part of the EU legal system (Foto-Frost). 36 In Van Gend, the EU Court of Justice was concerned that a different outcome 'would remove all direct legal protection' of the individual rights of the Community's nationals: '[t]here is the risk that recourse to the procedure under these Articles would be ineffective if it were to occur after the implementation of a national decision taken contrary to the provisions of the Treaty'.
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This multilevel system of protection was driven by the implicit idea that the individual and his/her rights enjoy better protection if an 'external' judicial control complements 'internal', domestic, judicial remedies. Kilpatrick explains these routes as the 'by-products of the 'great leap' taken by the EU Court of Justice:
'The twin doctrines of direct effect and supremacy to ensure that private individuals… would provide both more and better compliance by Member States with EU Law obligations they had assumed … The Court of Justice set out a division 
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In the Melki and Abdeli cases, the EU Court of Justice stated that national courts cannot be prevented from referring questions to the CJEU, and therefore, if an interlocutory procedure giving priority to the review of constitutionality of national law effectively prevents these courts from referring questions to the CJEU, such a procedure shall be prohibited under Art. 267 TFEU. 51 The EU Court of Justice emphasised the special importance of Art. 267 TFEU, stating that the national courts shall remain free to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU at whatever stage of proceedings they consider appropriate, on any question they consider necessary. 52 In the groundbreaking Opinion 2/13, the EU Court of Justice goes even further, describing the preliminary reference procedure as 'the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties', which will be affected if no special and the preliminary ruling procedure of Art. 267 TFEU, as it will influence the autonomy and effectiveness of the latter procedure.
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In Ferreira da Silva, the CJEU again emphasised the duty of a national court or tribunal, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, to comply with its obligation to make a reference to the Court in order to avert the risk of an incorrect interpretation of EU law, considering its crucial importance for judicial coherence and overcoming divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union. 54 Moreover, the EU Court of Justice clarified in recent Global Starnet Ltd judgment that Art. 267(3) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy is required, in principle, to refer a question for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of European Law even if, in the course of the same national proceedings, the constitutional court of the EU Member State concerned has assessed the constitutionality of national rules in the light of regulatory parameters with content similar to rules under EU Law.
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These lines of reasoning demonstrate that the CJEU continues to encourage the EU Member States' courts, especially the courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, to invoke the preliminary rulings mechanism, even in case of small doubts, therefore shifting responsibility for EU Law enforcement from the EU Court of Justice to the courts in the Member States.
'ACCESS TO JUSTICE': THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
In accordance with Art. 19(1) TEU, the EU Court of Justice remains the highest court of the legal order which has the task of adjudication on the validity of norms by reference to the Treaties, and its jurisdiction is exclusive as no other court has the competence to annul EU legislation. The Court is expressly granted jurisdiction to assess the legality of union acts and can exercise both ultra vires and fundamental rights review. This entails CJEU jurisdiction for both inter-institutional and 
